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THREE 
Boilerplate and Economic Power in 
Auto-Manufacturing Contracts 
Omri Ben-Shahar and James J. White 
Editor's Note: This chapter examines the boilerplate contracts used by auto makers to 
procure parts from suppliers. It identifies drafting and negotiation techniques that are 
used to secure advantageous terms. It also explores some prominent specific arrange-
ments as evidence that firms with bargaining power are exploiting their position to 
dictate self-serving but inefficient terms. Finally, it shows how standard contractual 
clauses solve the problem of ex-post hold-up by suppliers. 
Manufacturing contracts in the automotive industry have served a canonical 
role in the economic theory of contract and bargaining. The famous story 
of General Motors' relationship with its supplier Fisher Body in the 1920s is 
a landmark illustration of the problem of contractual hold-up, underlying a 
prominent theory of vertical integration and the nature of the firm.' The the-
oretical fascination with automotive procurement contracts is well deserved. 
There may be no other merchant-to-merchant contractual template that gov-
erns such fantastic economic stakes- hundreds of billions of dollars per year-
and implemented through a process that involves almost no negotiation of the 
legal terms. Boilerplate rules these transactions. 
There is a long line oflaw-and-economics scholarship studying the attributes 
of standard-form terms in contracts between sophisticated parties in high-
stakes transactions. One of the benchmark predictions in this literature is that 
contractual terms have to be efficient if they are to be consistently used by the 
parties. Any rent -seeking power that a party has should be translated into a price 
advantage; it should not be used to dictate selfish but inefficient performance 
terms. Furthermore, because legal terms such as warranties and remedies affect 
the costs borne by the parties, we expect that sophisticated parties will be 
"pricing" the terms and will be ready to redraft terms that cost more than 
they save. A study of automobile contracts provides an opportunity to test 
these predictions. These are transactions in which economic power is unevenly 
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distributed; much dickering takes place over prices and product design; but 
everything else is packed into boilerplate. Every party reads the boilerplate and 
understands its legal effect and its economic consequences. Do strong parties 
dictate efficient boilerplate and extract rents through prices and other purely 
distributive clauses? Do they tailor their terms to maximize their net gains from 
the transactions? 
Moreover, automotive-supply contracts are the paradigmatic long-term 
relationships that require a great deal of relationship-specific investments in the 
form of machinery, location of plants, and precontractual technology research. 
As the economic literature predicts, the interdependence of suppliers (who 
must invest in specializing for their buyers' needs) and buyers (who need spe-
cialized parts from their suppliers) gives opportunities for hold-up.2 These 
dangers make the contracts the primary tool for deterring hold-up and encour-
aging investment. What are the contractual techniques used to address the risk 
of hold-up? 
In answering these questions, we have taken a simple, almost na·ive approach. 
We read and compared industry boilerplate contracts and talked to lawyers who 
drafted these forms and to some nonlawyer industry participants. We provide 
a case study, but it yields some general insights. For example, the boilerplate 
contract terms between the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and 
the tier-1 suppliers show how economic power is translated into transactional 
advantage. From the contract terms, we can identify ways the OEMs extract 
value from their suppliers. Contrary to the fabled GM-Fisher Body story, we 
find no real problem of hold-up by suppliers. The claim that suppliers with 
a long-term contract can hold up the OEMs is based on a misunderstanding 
of the terms of the deal, the rules of contract law, and the structure of the 
market. Moreover, comparing the terms that appear in the purchase orders 
(POs) of the various OEMs reveals ways in which they differ and, surprisingly, 
it suggests that some of these terms may foster inefficiency. Finally, studying the 
way the form contracts are drafted gives a detailed understanding of how and 
when tailoring of terms takes place and how internal organizational features 
are harnessed to affect the outcome of negotiations over contract terms. 
I. The Contracts 
The automotive-supply industry is sometimes described as a pyramid built in 
"tiers." At the top are the OEMs. This study focuses mostly on the "Big Three" 
OEMs - General Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler - but it also looks at 
six foreign OEMs that assemble cars in the United States. Directly below the 
OEMs are the tier-1 suppliers - anyone who sells directly to an OEM. These 
companies usually sell sophisticated assemblies or parts, and most of them 
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specialize in designing and manufacturing automotive-specific products. They 
purchase their supplies from tier-2 suppliers who in turn purchase from tier-3 
suppliers, and so on. Because there are only a few OEMs at the top but roughly 
six hundred to eight hundred tier-1 suppliers, the main issues that need to 
be governed by the contracts between OEMs and tier-1 suppliers are different 
than in lower tiers. 
Supply contracts in the automotive industry are made through competitive 
bidding. An OEM issues requests for quotations for a particular part or assem-
bly. The supplier whose bid is picked would ordinarily make a significant capital 
investment in R&D and production assets and supply this part for the duration 
of the car model in which the part is assembled, a period that normally lasts four 
to eight years. The winning bidder, however, does not always get the security 
of a long-term, fixed-price contract. Although some OEMs accord the supplier 
a long-term sourcing commitment, the actual POs are issued on a short-term 
basis. Shorter contracts give the parties opportunities to renegotiate aspects of 
the deal such as price and quantity estimates; OEMs commonly demand (and 
receive) price reductions every year. Technically, most of these adjustments are 
not modifications of the contract but, rather, renewals of short-term POs, all 
entered into under a master long-term agreement. 
Each OEM has a single form, titled either "Global Terms" or "General 
Terms," that is used almost without exception for procuring all of the manu-
facturing parts. General Motors, for example, enters into roughly one million 
procurement contracts every year, at a total amount in excess of $80 billion -
all governed by a single contract form containing thirty-one paragraphs, trans-
lated into six languages. 
We expected little variation in the OEMs' forms. What we found was a 
different reality. There is significant variance across the OEM contracts. We 
examined the boilerplates of nine North American OEMs and recorded the 
many ways in which they differ. These differences were also confirmed in dis-
cussions with representatives of tier-1 suppliers and of the suppliers' trade 
association, who emphasized that the differences in the legal terms represent 
in some cases significant variations in the economic consequences of the deals. 
According to all of our interviewees, the most important issues in the OEM boil-
erplate contracts are the following: termination rights, warranties and reme-
dies, service parts, intellectual property rights in technological innovations, and 
tooling (the ownership of the production assets). We consider each of these 
issues. 
Termination. In all purchase contracts, OEMs secure the right unilaterally 
to terminate the agreement. This right to terminate, which is not available 
to suppliers, is almost unrestricted. Either for no cause at all or for reasons 
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stated ambiguously as "competitiveness of price and quality," the OEMs can, 
with short notice, terminate the contract. In fact, the cancellation rights are so 
one-sided that they might render the contracts unenforceable on the ground 
that they lack consideration or fail to state a quantity term under the statute 
of frauds.3 There is variation among OEMs' forms regarding the payments 
to which suppliers are entitled upon termination. Whereas all OEMs provide 
some recovery to suppliers for their squandered investments, some, such as 
GM and DaimlerChrysler, are stingy - they pay only for finished parts, work 
in progress, and raw materials. Others are more generous: They will pay for 
a combination of other termination costs, such as suppliers' obligations to 
their own subcontractors and investments in capital. None of the 0 EMs cover 
suppliers' unamortized investment in R&D and engineering - a great source 
of agony for suppliers who expect to cover their fixed costs only after several 
years of supply. 
It is difficult to identify the exact inefficiency that broad termination rights 
create, particularly because it is not clear how often these rights are exercised. 
Still, contracts containing harsh termination terms represent a de-facto trans-
formation of the long-term commitment into a series of short-term agreements. 
In this reality, suppliers anticipate pressures from OEMs to reduce prices even 
after they have been awarded a contract. This creates a risk ofhold-up by 0 EMs-
"reduce your price or be terminated"- that makes relationship-specific invest-
ments less valuable. 
Warranties and Remedies. Warranty provisions determine suppliers' liability 
for design defects, intellectual property infringements, and the cost of precau-
tionary recalls. There is significant variation across the contract in the sharing-
of-liability clauses, which reflect true differences in the cost allocations and 
which correlate with different systems for monitoring of defects. It appears 
that OEMs with the most self-serving warranty allocation terms are also those 
that take longest to detect and resolve a defect. That is, they are the ones for 
whom the total costs of defects are, on average, greater. One of our interview-
ees quoted the warranty cost per vehicle to be roughly $1,000 for an American 
OEM that uses the harshest warranty allocation terms4 but only about $250 
for a Japanese OEM that applies a more balanced approach.5 Furthermore, he 
pointed out that the American OEM takes, on average, 180 days from the time 
of the first indications of a parts defect until it is resolved; the Japanese OEM 
takes only forty days. Of course, Japanese cars may simply be better built than 
American cars. But other figures suggest that if there is a quality gap, it is not as 
significant as the gap in warranty costs. One way to measure intrinsic quality is 
the average number of problems per one hundred vehicles. Toyota and Honda, 
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for example, in 2003 reported 101 problems per 100 vehicles; GM, Chrysler, and 
Ford reported between 120 and 127 problems per 100 vehicles.6 This quality 
gap is much smaller than the warranty-cost gap, in which an American OEM 
suffers a cost roughly four times as high as that of the Japanese OEM. 
These figures are consistent with the prediction that parties who believe that 
they can shift the cost ofliability onto others would do less to reduce this cost. 
Put differently, in situations in which joint precautions by both supplier and 
buyer are necessary to prevent liability from mounting or in which suppliers can 
efficiently cure a defect, it is not surprising that the allocation of greater liability 
to the supplier reduces the OEM's need for a quick solution to any quality 
issue. What is surprising is that not all contracts are designed to induce more 
participation of the suppliers in the warranty process and thus fail to achieve 
efficiency. Compared, for example, to the boilerplate purchase contract drafted 
by the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA), which applies 
to all tiers, the American OEM's warranty is much harsher. The VDA contract 
gives the supplier a greater role in assessing any damage claim, participating in 
repairs and replacements, and limits the scope and duration of warranties. 
Service Parts. Service parts are sold in the retail market at a large premium. 
If the OEM alone may sell these parts, the supplier is deprived of a share of 
potential profits. And if the supplier is obligated to supply the OEM's require-
ments for these parts for years after the model production ends (when it is 
expected that volume efficiency, materials, and skilled personnel will no longer 
be available), the burden on the supplier can be large. 
Almost all OEMs require the supplier to agree to supply service parts for a 
period often to fifteen years after current-model production ends. Some OEMs, 
however, share the surplus that this production will yield. Honda and Toyota, 
for example, stipulate that the service-part prices will be negotiated by the 
parties when the time comes; that translates to a profit-sharing deal. Others 
(for instance, GM) require prices to remain at their low, production-phase 
price for an initial period, say three years, after which a higher negotiated price 
would be agreed on. Most harsh are terms that require suppliers to commit to 
fifteen years of postproduction supply and to refrain from raising prices above 
the production-phase prices. These provisions leave the supplier with the high 
cost of maintaining a production line but without the ability to recoup the 
expense through high sale volume. 
The service-parts provisions also have efficiency implications. Maintaining 
the production line and the skilled labor to produce the parts will be expensive. 
Pricing the parts based on the cost structure prevailing when volume is much 
higher is a poor way to reflect the true wholesale economic price and may 
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lead to suboptimal purchase decisions. OEMs are reluctant to hold minor 
inventories of parts and instead make frequent small-volume purchases. This 
requires the suppliers to "turn on the machines" repeatedly to produce small, 
highly inefficient quantities of parts. 
Intellectual Property. The production of assembly parts often requires the 
development and application of new technologies that have high value as intel-
lectual property beyond that particular application. Much of this technology 
passes over to the OEMs in the course of designing the parts and assembling 
them into the vehicles. The contracts grant the OEMs legal rights in these 
valuable information assets, not only to use them in production but also to 
control other uses. The most extreme position, found for example in Ford's 
contract, accords the OEM unlimited rights to all intellectual property of the 
supplier that is disclosed in the course of trade, except for patents registered 
before the supply. Suppliers also waive their trade-secret protection and assign 
to the OEMs all copyrightable works created under the contract without any 
royalty rights. The more restrained position, as in GM's contract, limits the 
OEMs' right to sublicense intellectual property and protects the confidential 
information of the supplier. 
Some suppliers refuse to grant such rights in their intellectual property. 
Companies whose main business is information technology (IT), such as the 
makers of software, are stubborn about this, and OEMs have learned to expect 
that they will not be able to dictate their terms to such suppliers. Indeed, some 
OEMs have specially drafted IT contracts that accommodate the expectations 
of their IT suppliers for more balanced terms. 
Suppliers that have the ability to develop new technologies but who cannot 
enjoy the full value of the technology they develop once appropriated by the 
OEM will have a weaker incentive to make investments. We can only speculate 
that OEMs that insist on harsh IP terms end up with cars that incorporate fewer 
technological advances. Some of the suppliers' representatives suggested that 
this is the case. 
Tooling. Representatives of tier-1 suppliers voiced many complaints against 
the tooling provisions. A repeated complaint was that OEMs who often pay for 
and own the tooling refused to allow the use of production assets to serve multi-
ple clients. The strict ownership terms and the restriction against commingling 
and co-serving can lead to wasteful duplicity of investments and, of course, to 
inefficiency. Moreover, this strict control of the machines makes the OEMs' 
potential threat to terminate a contract (and haul away the production line) 
more credible. The fear that relationship-specific investments by the suppliers 
would be squandered increases. 
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What can be learned from these examples of fundamental variations in the 
contract terms? Differences in corporate culture may explain the persistence 
of this variation and the lack of convergence. Furthermore, contract terms do 
not always reflect actual practices. The actual behavior under the contract may 
not vary as much as the variation in contract language. Generally, variation of 
terms across vendors does not itself indicate inefficiency. There may be varying 
efficient ways to do business. But looking at individual terms in their context, 
we believe that some of the boilerplate terms are inefficient. Warranty terms of 
some OEMs do not appear to solve a surplus maximization problem but rather 
to place the greatest ex-post burden on the seller. Likewise, intellectual property 
(IP) terms and service-parts arrangements of some 0 EMs do not reflect an opti-
mal sharing of a resource that is jointly created but instead provide one-sided 
gains. Given the enormous stakes, we expected that economic power would be 
used to dictate low prices, not selfish boilerplate. But that is not what we found. 
The boilerplate terms are not necessarily the cause of the inefficiency. The 
legal terms in the forms is the tail that is wagged by the business dog, not 
vice versa. It is plausible that many of these provisions are tailored to lever-
age the OEMs' economic and bargaining power in the negotiation stage into 
advantages at the performance stage, in which the parties are locked in a classic 
bilateral monopoly. American OEMs' record-breaking losses have driven them 
to capture any opportunity to shift costs to suppliers. But if indeed they do so 
in a way that reduces the overall surplus of the contracts, the shifting of costs 
ends up hurting the OEMs more than helping them. 
What we may be witnessing is a classic agency problem: Agents find ways 
to save costs in the domain that they control but often neglect to consider 
the effect of these cost -saving measures on activities that they do not control. 
If the pressure on suppliers is strong enough, they will accept harsh terms 
and low prices. And if there are inefficient consequences, they may eventually 
be counted on the scorecard of a different internal division. The lawyers and 
purchasing officials who write and negotiate the supply contracts invest much 
effort in tightening up the legal terms and in leveraging the OEMs' bargaining 
power in securing adherence to these terms. It is possible that this exercise of 
their power will degrade suppliers' cooperation and performance in ways that 
become clear only later. 
II. Drafting of Boilerplate 
One of the striking features of automotive-supply contracts between 0 EMs and 
their tier-1 suppliers is their simplicity. Each OEM has a single form used for 
procuring all of the manufacturing parts. General Motors, we mentioned, enters 
into roughly one million procurement contracts every year with suppliers all 
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over the world. With few exceptions, these deals are governed by GM's "Global 
Terms" -terms that are never challenged, neither at the negotiation stage (say, 
by battle of the forms) nor in litigation. 
Another notable feature of these boilerplate forms is their durability. Daim-
lerChrysler, for example, is still using the form that was drafted in 1985; GM's 
form goes back to 1986. Ford's old form had been in place since the 1950s, 
until it was recently revised in quite dramatic fashion in 2004. Although minor 
revisions addressing new problems are occasionally patched onto these forms, 
the main terms and conditions remain unchanged over a long period of time. 
These boilerplate contracts are simple. The terms are written in plain English. 
Although most of the tier-1 suppliers are large corporations with sophisticated 
legal counsel who read every word of the OEM contracts, and although each 
provision in these contracts can have significant effects on the division of 
the surplus, the clauses are drafted in a much simpler and shorter form than 
ordinary consumer contracts, which are usually lengthy, cumbersome, and 
legalistic. Perhaps this difference owes to the greater government regulation of 
consumer warranties; perhaps it has to do with the identity of the drafter- a 
buyer or seller. A seller-drafter needs to avoid the sweeping warranties of the 
UCC, whereas buyers like the OEMs need only to strengthen the pro-buyer 
UCC warranties. Note, also, that the difference between warranty terms in 
the auto-production context and other, consumer-related contracts cannot be 
explained by factors such as trade usage and course of dealing. The supplier's 
warranty to the OEM is governed solely by the express warranty term. 
Because boilerplate terms have to deal with many different types of situations 
and address many possible contingencies, drafting the standard form from 
scratch would seem a daunting task. It is often perceived, therefore, that the 
drafting ofboilerplate language in mass contracts involves not much more than 
a cut -and-paste task, whereby the drafter identifies similar forms used by other 
organizations that do similar business and - on the premise that "if they work 
for others, they'll also work for me" - borrows their language? Interestingly, 
the American OEM supply contracts were not drafted in this fashion. Each 
OEM contract was drafted by in-house attorneys in a concentrated effort over 
a short period of time with very little revision since. 
No Authority to Dicker. A principal way in which OEMs prevent deviations 
from their own terms is by restricting the authority of agents within the orga-
nization to approve different or additional terms. Suppliers in the chain peri-
odically try to negotiate or change the terms of the boilerplate imposed by 
the OEMs or other buyers. Both OEM and supplier representatives agree that 
changes in the boilerplate resulting from negotiations with an individual seller 
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are as rare as hens' teeth. Ford, for example, has erected a clever and conscious 
barrier to such negotiation: Only the global vice president for purchasing has 
the authority to change the terms on the form contract. 
Equality of Treatment. Another factor that limits the incidence of variation 
from the boilerplate terms is the strong formal commitment of OEMs to treat 
all their suppliers equally. Of course, transactions with suppliers vary signifi-
cantly with respect to the goods purchased, prices, volume, and the like. But 
all suppliers - from the mega corporations who produce car frames to the 
sellers of nuts and bolts- must take the same legal terms: payment provisions, 
termination rights, warranties and remedies, and so forth. OEMs believe that 
the fact that these terms are presented as nonnegotiable and that variations are 
not approved provides their suppliers with assurance that there is horizontal 
equity, that everyone is treated the same. 
Open-Ended Provisions 
0 EMs use such open -ended provisions to address some of the issues that would 
otherwise be most troubling for suppliers. With respect to some of these issues, 
the 0 EM elected to implement open-ended terms, thereby postponing the dick-
ering of the actual resolution of individual cases to the postperformance stage. 
The Dissemination of Boilerplate Terms across Tiers. OEM contracts with 
their tier-1 suppliers affect the contracts entered into in lower tiers. Tier-1 
suppliers, being strapped to the onerous OEM terms, turn around and offer 
the same terms to their own tier-2 suppliers. A striking metaphor that a tier-1 
representative used is "contractual DNA." Looking at contracts down the supply 
chain, one can identify the OEM for which a given supply is eventually intended 
by the terms of the lower-tier contracts. With each tier buyer copying some 
of the terms it had to accept as a supplier, the OEM's terms are "genetically" 
replicated down the chain. 
Exception 1: Information Technology Transactions. All of the 0 EMs reported 
that their relationships with IT providers were different from their relationships 
with conventional suppliers. Some OEMs have drafted different forms for IT 
suppliers. Ordinarily, IT suppliers insist on terms that grant them greater own-
ership in the intellectual property. They also successfully limit their liability and 
cap it at a level far below the liability that conventional suppliers may face, usu-
ally not to exceed the price paid for the component. Finally, they are reluctant 
to provide the same types of extensive warranties that OEMs usually demand. 
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It is hard to explain this exception. It may have to do with the concentration 
and leverage of the IT suppliers, led by Microsoft and other superpowers. But 
that would not explain the fact that even less powerful IT suppliers enjoy the 
more favorable terms. It may have to do with the importance of intellectual 
property clauses to IT firms because this is their only asset. Standing to lose 
more from the OEMs' IP provisions, their resistance to these expropriatory 
clauses is therefore more credible. But that would not explain the fact that IT 
firms succeed not only in securing better intellectual property terms but also 
far more lenient warranty and remedies provisions. Or, it may simply have to 
do with the fact that, unlike the ordinary tier-1 assemblers, IT firms do not buy 
parts and therefore do not have many tier-2s to which they can turn around 
and dump similar antiseller terms. 
Exception II: "Backdoor" Negotiations. Staff attorneys within the OEMs are, 
of course, the organ that keeps the tightest control on the boilerplate terms and 
guards against deviations. Other organs- specifically, engineers and purchasing 
agents - may have slightly divergent goals and motivations. The purchasing 
representatives are interested in the cost of the item and their performance is 
measured by their success in getting the lowest price. Engineers are interested 
in quality and uniqueness of features and operation and are less interested in 
cost. A time-honored but relatively crude way for a supplier to get better legal 
terms is to convince the OEM engineers that the supplier's part is the only 
acceptable part and to get the engineer to write the specifications to exclude 
others. Or one might get the OEM engineers to agree to "engineering change 
orders" that modify the specification of the part, enable the supplier to quote a 
new price (without going through a competitive bidding process), and increase 
the profit on the sale of the part. These ploys that result in higher prices offset 
some of the cost of unfavorable boilerplate. 
III. Economic Power 
At the outset of this study, we hypothesized that OEMs' bargaining power 
would be strongest at the bidding and contract formation stage and weakest 
once relationship-specific investments were made and performance began. We 
imagined that once the OEMs became dependent on a supplier, they would face 
instances of hold-up, in which the supplier demanded a better price and other 
terms. The standard hold-up account seems to fit this situation perfectly -
in fact, the hold-up theory was developed in the context of the GM-Fisher 
Body saga, which was an OEM-tier-1 relationship. This hypothesis, we explain 
later, turned out to be misguided. 
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We also hypothesized that economic power would echo down the supply 
tiers, with tier-1 suppliers being dominated by OEMs but exercising their own 
dominance over tier-2 suppliers. This, too, turned out to be only partially 
true. Some powerful companies, such as Exxon and General Electric, are in 
the tier-2 levels and are able to wield power because of their size and product 
mix. Other tier-2 suppliers have power because of their wide base of clients, 
extending beyond the automotive industry, and can afford to pass on automo-
tive contracts. Yet other low-tier suppliers have power that is supported by the 
uniqueness of their technology. Finally, the financial integrity of a firm turned 
out to affect its economic power in ways that are more subtle than we expected. 
How far can OEMs go in drafting one-sided terms? Surely, if suppliers have 
choices, they can bargain away these clauses. But, for automotive suppliers who 
sell a large chunk of their output to OEMs, in a market in which suppliers suffer 
severe overcapacity, there does not appear to be much choice. Even collective 
efforts by the suppliers through their trade association to draft a form more 
favorable to sellers have not, as far as we can tell, influenced even a single term 
of the OEMs' contract forms. 
When we move down from OEM contracts to lower tiers in the supply 
chain, bargaining power is no longer one-sided. Tier-1 suppliers cannot exert 
the same influence on tier-2s as OEMs exerted against them. For one, tier-1 
suppliers do not offer the same magnitude and rarity of deals as OEMs do. If 
an OEM turns down a bid by a manufacturer of passenger seats, a big chunk 
of the business cannot be salvaged. By contrast, if the same manufacturer of 
seats breaks the negotiations with the supplier of leather, that supplier would 
have many other business opportunities. 
Switching Costs and Hold-Up. An important factor that influences the con-
tracts among the OEMs and suppliers was the OEMs' significant switching 
costs. All of the OEM representatives acknowledged that the suppliers may 
have some power in the course of carrying out a long-term contract. Many 
current contracts are for intricate subassemblies that will be installed whole-
sale into a finished automobile. For example, an OEM might buy the entire 
heating and cooling system from a supplier, and the supplier might be the 
principal designer of the system. Because any such system must integrate with 
the car's electrical and other systems and must conform to the physical location 
that is set aside for it in the completed automobile, the "part" may be unique. 
It is this uniqueness that accords the supplier the power. 
If an OEM who abandons a supplier would suffer prohibitive costs in find-
ing and qualifying a replacement, the original supplier will have some eco-
nomic power over the OEM for the contracted goods or services for some 
40 • Omri Ben-Shahar and James J. White 
period - perhaps even to the end of the model run of the vehicle in which the 
part or assembly is installed. This power, we should expect, would be at its 
height shortly after production commences when the supplier looks forward 
to five years of work and the competing bidders have turned to other things. In 
fact, this conjecture- that a tier-1 supplier can exert hold-up power against an 
0 EM after production begins- is widely recognized as the benchmark example 
in economic theory for the general problem of contractual hold-up. The stan-
dard account of the hold-up problem was developed and generically illustrated 
in the context of the very same OEM-tier-1 contracts that we explored. It sug-
gests that in the 1920s, Fisher Body (a tier-1 supplier of automotive bodies) had 
a ten-year requirements contract with General Motors. When GM's require-
ments increased due to the greater demand for closed-body cars, Fisher Body 
enjoyed an "intolerable" position to hold up General Motors and to refuse to 
make adjustments that were overall efficient and was therefore acquired and 
vertically integrated into GM.8 It is not clear how much evidence substantiates 
the GM-Fisher Body hold-up story,9 and yet it seems plausible that in light of 
the high switching costs, OEMs would indeed be vulnerable to rent-extraction. 
As one leading economist explains: 
Why did GM and Fisher Body not simply write a better contract? Arguably, 
GM recognized that, however good a contract it wrote with Fisher Body, 
[ ... ] contingencies might occur that no contract could allow for. GM 
wanted to be sure that next time around it would be in a stronger bar-
gaining position; in particular, it would be able to insist on extra supplies, 
without having to pay a great deal for them. 10 
Our own findings suggest that, at least in the automotive business, this 
bargaining position-hold-up account is misguided. Even without looking into 
the contractual language, this account ignores the fact that each individual 
transaction is only part of a larger portfolio ofbusiness, both concurrently and 
into the future. Even for unique goods, the power of the supplier to hold up its 
buyer is effectively limited. If the seller uses its power to engage in explicit hold-
up (for instance, "Give me an increase in price or I won't ship"), it knows it will 
lose in the long run. Such threats by a seller would surely count against it in the 
award of new contracts. If hold-up by the supplier causes a disruption at one 
OEM, it is likely to become known and to be considered by other OEMs when 
bids are being evaluated. Thus, the short-term benefit from extracting some 
concession by hold-up would be more than offset by the long-term reputation 
sanction. 
The myth that suppliers can engage in hold-up overlooks a very basic fact. 
Suppliers trying to hold up OEMs must threaten to halt production of a part 
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that is necessary to keep the assembly line working. Such a threat, if carried 
out, would lead to enormous losses, constituting an entire meltdown in the 
industry. If the OEM can show that such hold-up amounted to breach of existing 
obligations, the tier-1 supplier would be subjected to potentially bankrupting 
damages, some of which can be set off by the OEM against the supplier's 
account as a matter of self-help. Moreover, the OEM would likely be able to 
get injunctive relief, 11 thus barring such a threat from being carried out in the 
first place. In other words, given that suppliers make contractual commitments 
prior to acquiring the hold-up power, successful hold-up must assume lethargic 
contractual obligation and legal enforcement, which is probably far from reality. 
Moreover, in his rebuttal of the Fisher Body myth, Ronald Coase speculated 
that problems of supplier hold-up can be addressed by OEMs contractually. 12 
We have seen some evidence for such contractual arrangements. First, OEMs 
have almost unconstrained authority to terminate contracts. That is, if anyone 
has the contractual power to threaten to walk away, it is the OEM, not the 
supplier. True, they may not want to terminate a contract for supply of unique 
parts, but they can threaten to terminate other contracts with this same supplier, 
to phase out its business. 
Second, OEMs maintain significant property rights in "tooling," namely, in 
the machines and production assets at the suppliers' plants, and they can haul 
these assets away once the contract is terminated, often with only stingy com-
pensation for suppliers' sunk investment. 13 This ownership-of-tooling mech-
anism can be regarded as a subtle version of vertical integration, conforming 
to the Klein-Hart hypothesis of the boundaries of the firm. However, if it is 
an ownership solution to the hold-up problem, it is not one that rises to com-
plete integration but rather a mechanism that accords OEMs partial ownership 
rights that gradually diminish over the life of the contract as the hold-up scare 
diminishes. The supplier is, in effect, posting a bond against hold-up; its invest-
ment will be amortized in the course of production but only if it sticks around 
for the long haul. 
Third, OEMs reserve for themselves, in other boilerplate terms, the right 
to control the very profitable market for service parts for years, sometimes 
decades, into the future, and to potentially share this profit with suppliers. 
Suppliers that hold up the OEM in the short run will lose in a big way in the 
division of the aftermarket surplus. 
Coase is correct in asserting that contractual provisions can protect OEMs 
from hold-up. But a more important aspect, we believe, and one that is also 
recognized by Coase, is that the "concern for their reputation would also have 
deterred the Fisher brothers from engaging in [hold up ]."14 The explanations 
we heard from all the participants confirmed that it is indeed the OEMs' long 
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memories and the sanctions they can levy upon bad suppliers in future deals-
that is, reputation sanctions- that render hold-up a bad strategy for tier-1 
suppliers. 
Thus, if long-term contracts confer power on the weaker seller but the 
seller cannot engage in hold-up, how is that power used? First, the power 
ameliorates the standard contract termination or cancellation terms. If the 
buyer cannot find a replacement, it cannot exercise its legal right to cancel. 
Second, particularly with a weak supplier, the contract may mitigate an OEM's 
setoff or hold-back of funds earned when the OEM claims that the supplier 
broke the contract. If the supplier is in a weak financial state, the OEM risks 
losing the supplier's production if it reduces the supplier's cash flow by setoff. 
We suspect that the seller's power is also expressed in more subtle effects on the 
buyer's use of its boilerplate. For example, we can imagine buyers hesitating to 
be as aggressive as they might be in using the boilerplate indemnity provision 
against an important seller. As we suggest earlier, a seller needs to be felicitous 
in its use of this power (for instance, "Can you give me some help with my 
increased material costs?") to escape identification as a chiseler who should be 
avoided when new contracts are awarded. Furthermore, because many tier-1 
suppliers produce a portfolio of parts, they can leverage the power they have in 
the supply of one crucial component to secure additional deals for other parts. 
Bankruptcy. The picture of a weak tier-1 supplier, squeezed by powerful OEMs 
that demand ever-growing discounts, can change dramatically when the sup-
plier experiences insolvency. When this happens, suppliers' threats to stop 
performing critical contracts become credible. They are credible because they 
come not from a company that is concerned with long-term business but from 
stern bankruptcy workout specialists who have no attachment to next year's 
business or even to next month's if current crises can be surmounted. In the 
automotive industry of today, in which suppliers' bankruptcy has become a 
real danger15 and their threat to file in Chapter 11 more credible, many sup-
pliers who are known to be suffering losses have a more powerful negotiation 
position vis-a-vis their buyers. 
Ironically, at times when the supplier's costs increase unexpectedly, it is 
that very weakness of the supplier's economic power and its inability to secure 
modifications to the contracts with the OEMs that can send it to bankruptcy 
and eventually bolster the credibility of its threat. Threats from the weak and 
desperate are more powerful than threats from the strong and rational. Indeed, 
the increasing hardship of the American automotive industry provides ample 
examples of this unfortunate dynamic. 16 These examples confirm that tier-1 
suppliers have no power to hold up the OEMs when the OEMs know that their 
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suppliers regard the costs of long-term retribution as greater than the near-
term gains from improved terms. But when retribution loses its effect, hold-up 
can be significant. Still, suppliers generally believe that even if it is bankruptcy 
that drives the price renegotiation, the victorious supplier will suffer significant 
detriments in future dealings. 
Conclusion 
So there you have it - sophisticated companies use rigid boilerplate forms 
to govern tens of billions of dollars of sales every year. The drafters of these 
forms are not the least embarrassed in admitting that they draft every term in a 
one-sided, self-serving manner. It turns out that such unrestrained economic 
power in contracting is exercised not merely against the weak and ill-advised 
but also against sophisticated partners to relational contracts. And yet, claims 
of "unconscionability" do not surface in this industry. Obviously, there is no 
element of duress or unfair surprise in the formation of these contracts. 
Our study has obvious limitations. Because our primary interest was the 
boilerplate contracts, the evidence we collected came from "legal" sources -
the contracts, the lawyers who draft them, the lawyers representing the parties 
to the purchase agreements, and the very small body of case law. In the shadow 
of this legal cloud, there may be a different business reality in which transac-
tions occur in a more balanced way, and OEMs exercise their power and their 
contractual entitlements in a selective and less selfish manner. Yet we found no 
evidence for such a gap. 
What are the lessons that can be drawn from this study? We do not claim any 
general conclusions about contractual behavior, nor do we aim any critique at 
the law or advocate any legal reform. The automotive production business is 
sufficiently idiosyncratic that much of what we have learned may be applicable 
only to this industry. For one, it is clear that much of the bargaining power 
account stems from the specific structure of the industry, in which specialized 
tier-1 companies are "captives"- they have immense investments in production 
capacity and can sell only to a handful of clients. The study does identify the 
important role that internal organization structures play in the formation of 
form contracts. That is, forms are a way for principals to exert control over 
terms offered by their agents. But what we found here was the flip side of this 
account. The internal hierarchy is not the reason for the forms but rather an 
instrument in implementing the forms as-is, without allowing any erosion of 
the terms. Constantly under pressure by counterparties to vary some terms, 
buyers have erected artificial internal structures to prevent purchasing agents 
from yielding to such pressures. This internal rigidity also explains the absence 
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of "menus" - the refusal of the drafting party to set prices under which its 
counterparties can "buy" better terms. 
Although some of our findings can be explained with clear economic logic, 
for others we did not find a compelling explanation. We do not offer a satisfac-
tory explanation for the variance of terms across the different OEM contracts 
or for the conjecture that some of these terms are inefficient. If we are right in 
suggesting that there is inefficiency in the legal provisions, it is possible- given 
the enormous stakes in this industry- that a lot of money is left on the table. 
Clearly, the OEMs are using any means to reduce costs and are pressuring their 
suppliers to the maximum extent. But, by using such harsh terms, the OEMs 
may be creating (or, at least, not eliminating) the deadweight loss. Another 
finding that left us puzzled is the IT forms; these are a remarkable exception to 
the otherwise one-sided boilerplate in the industry. We can offer only guesses 
as to why IT firms succeed in securing better terms. We leave this question for 
future inquiry. 
Finally, this study reinforces some doubts about theories of asymmetric 
information in contracting. We mentioned that a prominent line of thought in 
economic theory identifies contractual failures as the reason why firms organize 
the way they do and why some activities are outsourced and others are done 
in-house. Because auto-production contracts have served an important role 
in demonstrating these insights (the GM-Fisher Body story), we took a closer 
look at the actual contracts. We discovered a reality in which more things are 
"contractible" than previously suggested; where asymmetric information and 
imperfect verification are rarely obstacles for contracting; and where reputation 
sanctions quickly fill any void that the contracts may have left. And yet, the 
familiar economic story of vertical integration is not necessarily undermined. 
Although it is not manifested through outright takeover of supplier firms, we 
discovered that integration in production occurs in more subtle ways, such as 
contingent control over production assets and technological innovations. 
